The following case excerpt discusses the legal standard for False Advertising Claims.
The central question here is whether Salov’s labels were likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. The UCL, CLRA, and FAL, prohibit “not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which [,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 951, 45 P.3d 243 (2002), as modified (May 22, 2002). To state a claim based on false labeling, “it is necessary only to show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.'” Id. Thus the answer to the reasonable consumer question based on common facts, that is, identical statements on the labels of the products at issue. In cases alleging a deceptive advertising scheme under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL, it is well-settled that where “numerous consumers are exposed to the same dubious practice by the same seller…proof of the prevalence of the practice as to one consumer would provide proof for all.” Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808 (1971) (concluding that if material misrepresentations were made to members of the class, an inference of reliance would arise as to the whole class); see also In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 327 (2009) (inference of reliance arises wherever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material, and plaintiff need not demonstrate individualized reliance on specific misrepresentations to satisfy the reliance requirement); Williams v. Gerber Products, 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (same for CLRA).
CALL (973) 598-1980 for a Free Consultation on Your False Advertising Claim